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Abstract
This article looks at how imaginaries of land and climate play a role in farmland investment discourses and practices. For-
eign farmland investors in the fertile black earth region of Russia and Ukraine have ‘celebrated’ soil fertility while largely 
ignoring climatic factors. The article shows a centuries-long history of outsiders coming to the region lured by the fertile 
soils, while grossly underestimating climate which has had disastrous implications for farm viability and the environment. 
Comparisons with historical and contemporary literature on other regions (e.g. the US prairies and North Africa) suggest 
that the underestimation of climatic risks by newcomers is remarkably prevalent in resource frontiers.
Keywords Land imaginaries · Ignorance · Soil · Farmland investment · Climate
The Russian black earth soil is more valuable than 
gold (statement by renowned soil scientist Vasily V. 
Dokuchaev in the late nineteenth century).1
The Company holds ownership of an extensive land 
bank of first-class soil (…). The soil type, Chernozem 
or “black earth”, has a black color and contains a high 
percentage of humus…. It usually has great depth, over 
1 meter, and exhibits a clay like structure which facili-
tates agricultural field works and is also favorable for 
retaining water. (website of Swedish-owned farmland 
company ‘Black Earth Farming’ operating in Russian 
and Ukraine from 2005–2017).2
Introduction
This article examines the remarkable historical persistence 
of farmland imaginaries in the face of opposing evidence. In 
particular, it investigates how favourable imaginaries of the 
soil by farmland investors can sideline important climatic 
factors, with potentially far-reaching implications for farm 
operations and the environment. It will do so based on the 
case of the black earth, which is widely considered the most 
fertile soil in the world. Some of the world’s largest stretches 
of black earth (chernozem)3 can be found in southern Russia 
and most of Ukraine. Since the mid-2000s, this black earth 
area, the agricultural heartland of the former Soviet Union, 
has experienced a rapid rise of farmland investment in the 
context of the global farmland rush (or global ‘land grab’). 
The accounts of farmland investors flocking to this region 
in search of ‘untapped’ farmland have been littered with 
praise of ‘the black earth, millions of hectares of ultra-fertile 
agricultural land’ (The Local 2009), with soil that is ‘legend-
ary’4 and constitutes the ‘best soil of the world’ (Kuns et al. 
2016; Visser 2017), a ‘dream soil’ (The Local 2009), that 
farmers in the in the West ‘would kill for’. There is much 
scientific basis for praising the black earth, as there is little 
doubt that it is one of the most—if not the most—fertile 
soil(s) on earth, with many favourable features potentially 
allowing for high yields (Moon 2013). Also referred to as 
chernozemic soils, these soils can produce high agricultural 
yields due to their high humus content and high percentages 
of phosphoric acids, phosphorus and ammonia.
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Despite the huge benefits of chernozem for agriculture, 
the performance of foreign farmland investors in Russia and 
Ukraine has been below projections, and has in many cases 
been outright disappointing (cf. Kuns et al. 2016; Visser 
2017). Whereas the foreign farmland companies initially 
generated a lot of investment and had high stock valuations, 
reflecting high hopes for their performance, they appeared 
to operate at a loss, often for many years in a row, and two 
of them even had to delist. The first of the two main ques-
tions in this article is: How can this gap between projected 
and real life performance [of foreign farmland investments) 
in the black earth region be explained? This article argues 
that the investor narratives celebrating the black earth soil 
not only stirred up high expectations, but also contributed to 
the dismal performance.5 While the fixation on the soil was 
an efective device to ‘sell’ the business case for global farm-
land investment in the region, it also blinded the farmland 
companies themselves. Relevant aspects of farming, such 
as the run-down rural infrastructure and volatile weather, 
were downplayed, sidelined, or completely ignored, both in 
terms of discourses and farm strategies, and operations. It 
will be shown that amongst a wide range of factors that fell 
by the wayside in farmland investors’ assessments due to the 
fixation on the soil, the ignorance of climate was particularly 
striking and arguably the one with the most far reaching 
negative repercussions for the profitability of their farms.
The narratives of these contemporary farmland investors 
are only the latest incarnation of long-standing farmland 
imaginaries of the black earth. This article will show that 
there is a remarkable continuity in the ‘celebration’ of the 
black earth. Even since the southward and eastward expan-
sion of the Tsarist Russian empire in the late seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries, the ignorance or misunderstand-
ing of climate has prevailed (Wheatcroft 1977; Wheatcroft 
and Davies 1994; Moon 2013). This ignorance has persisted 
despite a long record of disappointing farming results by 
newcomers in the Soviet and pre-Soviet era that resulted 
from, or were reinforced by, such ignorance. The above-
mentioned land imaginaries thus hindered newcomers in 
efectively adapting to agro-climatic circumstances. The 
article will subsequently ask the second main question: How 
could such land imaginaries persist, and climate continu-
ously be ignored, in the face of meagre farm performance, 
and growing evidence that was at odds with prevailing land 
imaginaries?
By addressing the two questions above, this study dem-
onstrates how land imaginaries can take on a life of their 
own, have far reaching implications for farm operations and, 
more generally, afect how people relate to land. In addition, 
it examines what contributes to the resilience of farmland 
imaginaries in the face of opposing evidence. More broadly, 
in line with Sippel and Visser (2020) it argues that in exam-
ining resource making projects and resource frontiers, it is 
imperative to pay attention to the (often overlooked) issues 
of representation and knowledge making (and obscuring), 
particularly as expressed in farmland imaginaries.
This article aims to build on, and integrate, social science 
literature on how nature (and land in particular) is made 
into a natural resource (Richardson and Weszkalnys 2014; 
Li 2014), and financial asset (Ouma 2016; Visser 2017), the 
literature on farmland investment (e.g. Visser et al. 2012; 
Wolford et al. 2013), and environmental histories (e.g. Wor-
ster 1979; Moon 2013, 2020), in particular those of frontier 
(steppe) regions in settler colonies (Worster 1979; Cronon 
1991; Moon 2020) but also to some extent in the global 
South (Davis 2007, 2011). Studies on assembling the various 
aspects of farmland into a financial asset have not yet paid 
much attention to the historical dimension of this phenom-
enon, as Ouma (2016) observed. This article attempts to 
correct this gap by taking a historical approach to farmland 
assemblage in a specific region, building on studies of the 
historical dimensions of contemporary investment and com-
modification in natural resources (Edelman and León 2013) 
and social-environmental histories of geographical regions 
(Worster 1979; Cronon 1991; Moon 2013, 2020).
This article is structured as follows. The next section lays 
out the conceptual framework and is followed by a section 
on the study region and methodology. The third section dis-
cusses the celebration of the black earth soil in the 2000s and 
in the past centuries. The fourth section examines investors’ 
long-standing ignorance of climate in the black earth region, 
and the resulting negative repercussions. The fifth section 
asks how it has been possible that farmland imaginaries cel-
ebrating the chernozem, and ignoring climate, have been so 
persistent. To this aim it discusses other regional examples 
of long-standing ignorance or underestimation of climate 
by foreigners or outsiders from other continents. The final 
section concludes that the ignorance of climate seems to be 
remarkably common for farmland imaginaries in contempo-
rary and historical resource frontiers worldwide.
Theoretical framework: land imaginaries, 
asset making, and environmental history
The way in which specific environments enable or obstruct 
farmland investment has not been researched in depth (Wol-
ford et al. 2013). Agrarian studies mostly discuss biophysi-
cal environments only briefly to show how they are consid-
ered attractive for land acquisitions by investors (Goldstein 
2016, p. 756). Virtually no studies ‘have articulated how 
certain lands and ecologies are managed’ once acquired 
by investors, and ‘how that environmental management is 
underpinned by knowledge claims of land’s suitability for 5 Amongst other factors (see below).
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consolidation and development’ (ibid.). Following Li (2014), 
the question has shifted to how land can be constructed as 
suitable for, and consequently attract, investment (cf. Gold-
stein 2016, p. 756). So far, studies on the construction of 
farmland as an attractive investment have looked at investor 
narratives related to the property and territorial aspects of 
land, although occasionally they superficially touch upon 
ecological characteristics. For instance, it has been widely 
noted that the framing of lands as ‘unused’ or ‘marginal’ is 
a strategy of farmland investors and investor-oriented states 
to legitimize low-cost acquisition by investors (Visser et al. 
2012; Wolford et al 2013). While research attention has 
focused on how investors’ discourses purposefully use par-
ticular notions of land that benefit their business, they are 
also likely to be influenced by more implicit, unintentional 
notions of land. I contend, that the concept ‘land imaginar-
ies’ is particularly useful to unearth those more hidden con-
ceptions of land.
Land imaginaries
Actions of investors and other actors do not just result from 
the direct materialization of their economic or political 
interests. Interests and strategies on the one hand, and con-
crete farmland operations and transformations on the other, 
are mediated, and shaped, by land imaginaries, namely the 
notions of what land is, what it can or should do, and how 
humans can or should interact with it (Sippel and Visser 
2020, cf. Jasanof 2015 on socio-technical imaginaries more 
broadly). Such land imaginaries might not always be well 
articulated or consciously be used. Rather, land imaginaries 
constitute mental frameworks that inform practical engage-
ments with land, implicitly and unreflexively (Davis 2011). 
Land imaginaries in this context refers to the taken-for-
granted ideas that groups have developed about land, which 
also unconsciously influence uses of land. Such imaginaries 
might be reflected in narratives, financial indicators, maps, 
or websites. The implicit and un-reflexive nature that char-
acterizes land imaginaries means that land imaginaries can 
also have unexpected or undesired implications. Much of 
the farmland investment literature sees farmland investors 
as opportunistically juggling notions of land in sophisti-
cated ways to portray their investment most favourably to 
funders, states, and communities, in order to relentlessly fur-
ther their investments. However, while investors influence 
society with their discourses on farmland, this article will 
show that investors themselves are also influenced by wider 
land imaginaries in society.
(Over)optimistic investor discourse based on shallow 
land imaginaries (e.g. imaginaries that ignore certain risks 
and subsequently overestimate the productivity of the 
farmland) may ensure funding and state support, but may 
also trap the investors themselves in high-risk, unfeasible 
investment projects (cf. Visser 2017). This article focuses 
on what imaginaries downplay or ignore by combining 
literature on farmland imaginaries with recent literature 
on ignorance (or ‘agnotology’) (Proctor 2008), particularly 
regarding the environment (ibid.; Uekötter and Lübken 
2014). While investor discourses and land imaginaries can 
be modified, stretched, and embellished, the materiality 
of the land in question shows more resistance to human 
intervention. Whereas some studies on materiality focus 
predominantly on how the interaction between human 
and non-human actors creates (socio)natures, this arti-
cle assumes that physical objects of nature exist or alter, 
both in interaction with humans, as well as independently 
(cf. Moon 2020, p. 22). From this perspective, even fea-
tures of the natural environment that exist (largely) inde-
pendently of human influences are perceived selectively 
(Hirsch 1995) through various senses or tools (cf. Cos-
grove 2003). This selectivity influences how humans use 
and shape nature, and ultimately influences how humans 
are afected by it themselves.
Resource and asset making
In order to understand how the black earth soil became 
so central in the discourses of the investors operating in 
Russian and Ukrainian agriculture, this article draws on 
literature that studies how objects of nature become natu-
ral resources (Richardson and Weszkalnys 2014), and sub-
sequently possible financial assets (Larder et al. 2017; Li 
2014; Ouma 2016; Visser 2017). Although transnational 
farmland investments, especially those made by the finan-
cial sector, are considered increasingly footloose, virtual, 
and detached from the ‘real’ economy, the involvement 
of foreign and financial players in farmland investment 
necessitates taking the materiality of the investment object 
seriously. First, although recognizing that resource making 
as a human process is important, one should not ignore 
the limits set by the supposedly ‘inanimate’ natural envi-
ronment to the cognitive and practical process of creat-
ing natural resources (Richardson and Weszkalnys 2014, 
p. 15). Indeed, as Richardson and Weszkalnys (2014, p. 
15) contend, ‘the “becoming” of resources is now bet-
ter understood in terms of the uses and possibilities that 
matter afords to us—what may be referred to as material 
agency or potentiality, which themselves depend on the 
historical, social and material environments which inform 
the constitution of the resource matter’ (cf. Bennett 2010). 
Another important insight is that natural resources are ‘a 
potent social category into which—and out of which—can 
slip those parts of the non-human world to which humans 
attached value’ (Bridge 2009, p. 1218). When framed as 
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resources, financial assets are assemblages that do not 
automatically have fixity. They can be reassembled and 
reconstituted into new arrangements (Li 2014; Visser 
2017). Resource making does not only involve moving 
between non-resource and resource states. It is often a 
multi-faceted and multi-directional process (Visser 2017).6 
At its core, resource making, and its advanced stage of 
asset making, is a process of abstraction (Richardson and 
Weszkalnys 2014, p. 13), including separation and simpli-
fication/reduction on both material and conceptual levels. 
These two aspects—separation and simplification—are 
very pronounced in the black earth imaginaries. In parallel 
to physical abstraction, the resource may also go through 
processes of homogenization and standardization (e.g. 
Richardson and Weszkalnys 2014, p. 13). The term ‘(farm)
land’ itself is already an abstraction (Li 2014). Before it 
is conceived of as ‘land’, it is ground, soil, pasture, earth 
et cetera (ibid).
Environmental histories
The academic literature on farmland investment has been 
strongly ingrained in critical agrarian studies, allowing 
broad comparisons across the centuries, especially regard-
ing colonialism and the enclosure movement in England (cf. 
White et al. 2012). However, these were mostly quite gen-
eral comparisons of a macro and global nature, not in-depth 
social and/or environmental histories of land investment in 
specific regions or countries. Given the lack in the literature 
on farmland investment of both attention for (1) materiality, 
in the form of the ecological/biophysical base and (2) the 
historical trajectories of farmland investment (and related 
imaginaries), engaging more with the field of environmen-
tal history is warranted. Environmental history deals with 
both the materiality of nature and its impact on humans; 
the impact of humans on nature; and human perceptions of 
nature (Worster 1977). This article mostly focuses on the 
first and the last aspects.
Drawing on environmental history is particularly appro-
priate for this study. The black earth region constitutes the 
birthplace of soil sciences. Further, the work of the pio-
neer—and arguably the founding father—of soil science, 
Dokuchaev, which is based on his expeditions to the cher-
nozem region, also sparked the first ecological histories. 
However, both in the Soviet and post-Soviet period, studies 
of agriculture and farmland in the region have heavily pri-
oritized a human centred analysis with political economy, 
property, and resistance, as prevalent concepts. The immense 
ideological and political transformations in the region, and 
the study of them, relegated the role of the environment to 
the margins of social science research. Rare exceptions of 
scholars giving nature a more central place analytically, are 
Smith (2014) and Wheatcroft (1977) (cf. Wheatcroft and 
Davies 1994). Besides these studies, this article builds on the 
milestone environmental history study of the black earth by 
David Moon (2013), which covers the period of the expan-
sion of Russian agriculture into the steppes of the black earth 
region, in the Tsarist era. Overall, this study does not claim 
to ofer an extensive environmental history by juxtaposing 
and comprehensively assessing diferent representations as 
an aim itself. This article solely approaches diferent histori-
cal and contemporary statements about land, including by 
environmental historians, as objects of analysis in a land 
imaginaries framework.
Delving into the black earth area: regional 
focus and methodology
This paper focuses on farmland investment in the chernozem 
area of Russia and Ukraine as a whole. As largely similar 
agro-ecological conditions feature throughout the region, it 
makes sense to have natural conditions, rather than country 
borders, determine the boundaries of the study. Further, due 
to the two countries’ strongly interwoven history—during 
both Tsarist and Soviet periods—there are many similarities 
between them. They also feature very strong similarities in 
agrarian development in the post-Soviet era. Despite difer-
ences in the design and speed of their agricultural reforms 
and the land market, both countries simultaneously experi-
enced the emergence of outside investors, who accumulated 
large landholdings and clustered multiple privatized col-
lective and state farms into so-called agroholdings (Visser 
and Spoor 2011). Finally, many investors, at least until the 
2014 conflict between Ukraine and Russia and the souring 
of relations between the two countries, saw the black earth 
as a single farmland investment region (with landholdings 
spread across the Ukrainian-Russian border) (Kuns et al. 
2016). Agroholdings in Ukraine and Russia—both foreign 
and domestic—control very large, almost record-breaking 
landholdings, with up to several hundred thousand hectares 
and up to some 2000 employees (Visser et al. 2012; Kuns 
et al. 2016).
This article builds on primary and secondary literature, as 
well as multi-sited fieldwork.7 In-depth interviews and infor-
mal conversations were conducted with foreign and domestic 
farmland investors operating in Russia and Ukraine, mainly 
in the period 2013–2017. Interviewees were representatives 
7 Some of the interviews and documents were collected during joint 
research with Brian Kuns (cf. Kuns et al. 2016).
6 This is even more so the case for asset making, which can be seen 
as a more ‘advanced’ form of commoditization than resource making 
(Visser 2017).
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of Swedish, Danish, Dutch, German, UK, and US companies 
that had acquired farmland in Russia and/or Ukraine. Four 
of these companies (three Nordic and one German) were 
among Russia’s top 25 largest landowners. The interviews 
were conducted in combination with farm visits as well as 
at company headquarters and business meetings in Western 
Europe. Document and web search of mostly Russian and 
English language sources included corporate documents of 
listed companies, business media, and historical sources, 
as well as visual analysis of contemporary sources such 
as photographs and videos. The term ‘investor discourse’, 
next to narratives by investors and managers/directors of 
investor-led farm companies, also encompasses the busi-
ness press reporting on farmland investment and related 
consultants and intermediaries. The Ukrainian and Russian 
governments have largely facilitated farmland investment, 
employing land imaginaries resembling those of investors 
(Visser et al. 2012).
While going back in time to examine imaginaries of 
newcomers to the chernozem region, the nature of these 
newcomers and sources of this study change. The primacy 
of foreign companies amongst contemporary newcomers 
means that the sources consist of corporate documents and 
business press articles. In the Soviet era, it was foreign farm 
consultants and scientists who visited the region. These 
visitors’ encounters with the black earth are investigated, 
based on the scant scholarly sources describing them (Iofe 
and Nefedova 1998; cf. Smith 2014). In the pre-Soviet era, 
the newcomers consisted of US scientists working for the 
US Department of Agriculture (in the late nineteenth–early 
twentieth century), and Russian and Western scientists and 
explorers in the service of the expanding Russian empire (in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries). For the pre-Soviet 
period, this article draws on the excellent environmental 
histories by Moon (2013, 2020) combined with the study of 
primary (digitalized) historical sources (e.g. Tooke 1800; 
Johnson 1843; Carleton 1900; Dokuchaev 2017).
Celebrating the black earth
‘Let’s go east’ is the title of a thread on a web forum for 
German farmers, filled with glowing comments regarding 
investment in Russia. ‘Let’s go, lads,’ one farmer wrote 
enthusiastically in 2012. ‘The thawing permafrost soil is 
waiting for us (…). Get over there and farm as far as the 
horizon!’ (Winter 2012). The vast areas of farmland, and 
the availability of abandoned land featured widely in the 
accounts of Western investors heading East (Visser et al. 
2012). As the New York Times expressed it, there were ‘mil-
lions of acres of untouched, pristine land’ (Kramer 2008) 
awaiting investment. The idea of almost infinitely ongoing 
fields of fertile land for the taking captured the imagination 
of Western investors. Other aspects of farmland in the black 
earth area, such as the large, flat, and square nature of the 
land plots, also appeared. However, the black earth soil 
itself predominantly captured the imagination. It featured 
prominently in accounts of foreign investors as well as in 
news articles. News articles of farmland investment in the 
chernozem region sometimes referred to statements by Vas-
ily Dokuchaev—the nineteenth-century founder of Russian 
earth sciences—who called chernozem ‘the tsar of soils’ 
(Dokuchaev 2017, p. 343), which is ‘more valuable than 
gold’ (Dokuchaev 1994). Corporate documents and web-
sites widely celebrated the soil, sometimes with pictures of 
it underlining the story. One Swedish farmland investment 
company, ‘Black Earth Farming’, even had the chernozem 
prominently figuring in its name. The company’s website 
prominently explained the soil’s many qualities such as its 
‘high percentage humus’, its ‘great depth’, and favourable 
structure for retaining water.8 The soil’s celebration put 
excessive attention on the soil, separating it from other rel-
evant factors related to farmland investment, which were 
subsequently downplayed or forgotten. The focus on the 
soil—and the ignorance of the land’s other features and 
wider context—is for instance illustrated by Black Earth 
Farming’s director-founder, Mikhael Orlov. In his eforts 
to attract investors, he embarked on a ‘road-show’ along 
Europe’s financial centres. Some black earth soil was a 
consistent prop on these visits; he showed it to potential 
investors, inviting them to see and feel its quality (Visser 
2017; cf. Deutsche Welle 2008). This display clearly illus-
trates the process of simplification and abstraction through 
which one particular aspect of a resource is separated—a key 
step in asset-making (Li 2014; Visser 2017), with investors 
employing farmland imaginaries which narrow down ‘land’ 
to solely ‘soil’.
The long history of celebrating the black earth
The celebration of black earth soil has a long history, which 
at least goes back to the expansion of the Russian empire 
to the black earth steppes in the late seventeenth century. 
Cornelius Cruys, a Dutch naval officer who served Peter the 
Great during conquests and explorations along the Southern 
fringe of the empire at the turn of the seventeenth and eight-
eenth centuries, noted that the ‘land is so rich (zhirna), that 
without manuring the inhabitants receive twice as much for 
their labours as farmers manage to get in other countries’ 
(Cruys 1824, p. 286). In the eighteenth century, during her 
tour of newly acquired lands in what is now Southern Russia 
and Ukraine, Empress Catherine the Great noted: ‘where 
they sow, there is abundance (…). This region is in truth a 
8 See footnote 2.
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paradise (…) here, without forcing nature, with little care 
and less expenditure, there is everything one could want’ 
(Moon 2013, p. 44). Many Western observers who visited 
the black earth after Cruys likewise noted the soil’s immense 
fertility (Johnson 1843, p. 6; Veber 1795, p. 169).
The depth—or thickness—of the soil, as indicator of its 
immense fertility, features widely in contemporary and his-
torical accounts of the black earth. Contemporary foreign 
investors visiting the black earth region have been impressed 
by how ‘amazingly deep’ the soil is with its ‘prodigiously 
productive capacity’.9 ‘It’s ideal farmland—thick black earth 
with an extremely thick layer of humus soil’ (Winter 2012). 
The farm company Black Earth Farming, which elaborately 
discussed the many features of the soil it is named after on 
its website, specifically stressed that it ‘usually has great 
depth, over 1 m’. When shown pictures of the thick black 
soil by an agronomist of the Black Earth Farming company, 
a farm forum’s audience reportedly ‘groaned with envy’ 
(ibid; cf. Visser 2017, p. 195).
In the process of simplification that is necessary to turn 
natural resources into standardized financial assets, depth 
was a key parameter, probably trumping all other possi-
ble soil indicators (organic matter, soil structure, capacity 
to hold water, etc.). Since the time of Herodotus, visitors 
to the black earth region have been noting the ‘good deep 
soil’ and its fertility (Moon 2013, p. 44). In the mid-fif-
teenth century Josaphat Barbar stated that, in the Southern 
black earth region near Russia’s Don delta, local villagers 
attained yields of up to 1:100 from the fertile soil (Moon 
2013, p. 44). In 1767 the proponent of steppe colonization 
Petr Rychkov spoke of the Russian chernozem in the Oren-
burg region as ‘the good, rich, soft, and thick black-earth’ 
(Sunderland 2004, p. 76). In a book about the economy in 
the Volga region from 1795 an author celebrates the depth 
of the ‘famous’ soil, which
mostly consists of a top layer of 3 to 4 foot [1 foot is 
30.48 cm], but sometimes thelayer of black earth is 
even several arshin’ [old measurement equalling 71.12 
cm](Veber  1795, p. 169).
A 1900 report by William Tooke (1900, p. 65), a member 
of the free economic society of St. Petersburg and the Impe-
rial Academy of Sciences, mentioned that in some places 
the black earth is up to the ‘depth of an ell’ (1.143 m). At 
the 1889 Paris World exhibition, the award-winning col-
lection of Russian soils curated by Dokuchaev showcased 
a full cubic meter of chernozem (Shevchenko 2008), aptly 
visualizing its depth, and was praised as the ‘standard of 
fertility’ (ibid). A 1900 USDA report concluded that the 
depth of Russian chernozem ‘is, on average, probably a 
little greater than that of our prairie soil’ (Carleton 1900, 
p. 8). The celebration of the amazing depth of the black 
earth soil harboured strong connotations of endless fertil-
ity and easy farming. Observations of pre-Soviet visitors to 
the Russian black earth region that peasants made no efort 
to fertilize the soil (Moon 2013), carry connotations of the 
deep soil enabling almost efortless, risk free farming. West-
ern observers were astonished by peasants who did not use 
manure, but just stockpiled ‘enormous piles’ beyond their 
barns (Johnson 1843, p. 6). A visitor in 1795 mentioned 
that the black earth soil is ‘famous, in that it doesn’t require 
new manure’ (Veber 1795, p. 169). Even without manure, 
harvests were so abundant that peasants sometimes left part 
of the grain unharvested on the fields (Moon 2013, p. 44).
Overall, it is remarkable how the many features of the 
black earth soil (structure, organic matter, chemical compo-
sition, content of minerals, etc.), have so recurrently been 
simplified into one indicator—namely depth—in farmland 
imaginaries from the seventeenth century to the present. 
That this particular indicator was chosen, seems due to: first, 
it being an easily observable, simple indicator; and second, 
the seemingly straightforward parallel between sheer depth 
of the chernozem and its almost endless fertility. This par-
allel has also been noted in black earth areas elsewhere in 
the world.10
Disappointing farm performance 
and the ignorance of agro‑climatic factors
The fixation on soil depth, this section will show, has left 
little room for more cautious perceptions of the benefits 
and risks of black earth farmland, with attention to climate 
risk being the biggest casualty. Investors initially paid scant 
attention to the chernozem region’s climate risks and were 
subsequently caught of guard by the harsh climate, with 
costly implications for their endeavours. Subsequently, it 
will be shown that investors could have anticipated these 
risks had they taken note of the scientific literature. The last 
sub-section describes how investors look(ed) back at their 
initial ignorance of climate risk.
Investor accounts of weather risks
The flipside of the farmland imaginary’s focus on soil 
was that foreign investors paid little attention to weather 
and agro-ecological risks in the black earth region. The 
10 Cronon (1991, p. 98) for instance, states that the deep black soil in 
the Great Plains ‘seemed an almost inexhaustible fund of fertile earth’ 
to the US settlers in the West.
9 https ://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/268d7 4fc-f8e0-11e1-8d92-00144 
feabd c0.html#axzz3 mSYei rp2.
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companies did acknowledge that ‘poor or unexpected 
weather conditions’ could be a ‘significant’ risk, and that the 
growing season in Russia and Ukraine is quite short (BEF 
2007, p. 17; Trigon Agri 2007, p. 15). However, these state-
ments were ‘general, formulaic and/or obvious in nature’ 
(Kuns et al. 2016, p. 209). The investigated corporate docu-
ments did not refer to specific weather data and occupied just 
a small paragraph in elaborate risk assessments (spanning 
some 10–15 pages), predominantly concerned with the polit-
ical risks (cf. Kuns et al. 2016). The company Trigon Agri 
(2007, p. 30) even contended that ‘the Black Earth region is 
less susceptible to extreme weather conditions’ than West-
ern Europe and the US (cf. Kuns et al. 2016). A Western 
manager at a Ukrainian farm spoke of ‘a farmer’s heaven, 
an (ideal) climate (…) and phenomenally productively land’ 
(sic).11 Climate change did not figure prominently in the 
foreign investors’ risk assessments either, as initially scien-
tists and policy makers widely suggested that climate change 
would be favourable for Russian agriculture.
Weak agricultural performance
In contrast to the huge potential of the chernozem noted by 
visitors, the agricultural performance of foreign investors in 
Russia and Ukraine has frequently been disappointing (cf. 
Kuns et al. 2016; Visser 2017). The three large stock-listed 
foreign farm companies, for instance, had many years that 
ended in red figures, and they faced a sharp drop in their 
stock valuation. Two of them even felt forced to delist and 
sell of their farmland holdings, and the third one (formerly 
Trigon Agri, now Agromino) sold of the Russian part of its 
landholdings.12 Several factors have contributed to dismal 
farm performance, such as the weak transport and storage 
infrastructure (particularly in Russia), corruption, and exces-
sive bureaucracy (Winter 2012), diseconomies of scale of 
the rapidly expanding, finance-driven large farms (Kuns 
et al. 2016), low payment and motivation of farm work-
ers, and geopolitical tensions following the 2014 conflict 
between Russia and Ukraine. However, while these political 
and socio-economic factors have received substantial cover-
age in the literature, virtually no attention has been given 
to the subject of this article: how the investment outcome 
has been influenced by the investors’ farmland imaginaries, 
in particular their ignorance of the harsh climate, that has 
persistently troubled the region’s agriculture.
Soviet farming and adverse climatic conditions
It is well known that Soviet (and pre-Soviet) agricultural 
performance was problematic and fluctuated heavily annu-
ally. The causes behind this abysmal performance are still 
being discussed, especially with regard to the Soviet state’s 
role in reinforcing, ignoring or creating bad harvests and 
famines in the Stalin era. While there is little doubt that vari-
able weather was a significant contributing factor (Wheat-
croft 1977; Wheatcroft and Davies 1994; Iofe and Nefedova 
2004; Smith 2014), there is considerable debate regarding 
the relative importance compared to other factors. More 
important for the purposes of this article is the finding from 
in-depth studies that the climate in the heartland of the for-
mer Soviet Union (now the black earth region of Russia and 
Ukraine) has an exceptionally harsh climate with volatile 
weather in comparison with other major agricultural areas 
in the world. Clearly, compared with Western Europe, Rus-
sia and Ukraine, and their chernozem region, have a much 
harsher climate with much colder and longer winters and 
subsequently shorter growing seasons (Dronin and Bellinger 
2005, p. 228). Iofe and Nefedova (2004, p. 47) note that 
‘Kursk (52° N. Lat.) located in the middle of Russia’s cher-
nozem belt, has colder winters than Helsinki, Finland (61° 
N. Lat.)’. The continental climate of the North-American 
prairies is more similar to the black earth belt of Russia and 
Ukraine. Yet, as various studies from the early twentieth 
century onwards have demonstrated, the climate in Russia’s 
chernozem region stands out as harsher even in comparison 
with the US (Carleton 1900; Field 1968; Wheatcroft 1977; 
Iofe and Nefedova 2004; Dronin and Bellinger 2005).
Already from the late nineteenth century onwards, grow-
ing numbers of US scientists travelling to Russia, often dur-
ing missions for the US department of agriculture (USDA) 
besides observing numerous similarities with the US great 
plains, noted the harsher conditions in Russia (Moon 2020, 
pp. 95–96, 112). Carleton’s (1900) observations were par-
ticularly in-depth (cf. Moon 2020). Similarities such as the 
highly unequal precipitation throughout the year, the ‘exces-
sive heat of midsummer, following intensely cold winters’, 
and the comparatively light snowfall (reducing available 
moisture in spring), he argued, are ‘considerably more pro-
nounced for corresponding portions of the grain belt in Rus-
sia’ [largely coinciding with the chernozem belt, OV] than 
the US (Carleton 1900, p. 9). More specifically,
(t)he snow fall (..) is less (..) than on the Great Plains. 
The rainfall is considerablyless, and the extremes of 
temperature a little greater (Carleton  1900, p. 9).
In Samara, an important wheat producing region in the east-
ern, drier part of Russia’s black earth, the mean yearly rain-
fall was 396.4 mm (15.6 inches), whereas in Bismarck North 
Dakota, which was already considered as having extremely 
11 https ://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/268d7 4fc-f8e0-11e1-8d92-00144 
feabd c0.html#axzz3 mSYei rp2.
12 The 2014 geopolitical tensions between Russia and Ukraine were a 
direct trigger, but longstanding economic problems due to underesti-
mated climatic conditions were a more fundamental cause.
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low precipitation for wheat, annual rainfall was 482.6 mm 
(15.6 inches) (Carleton 1900, p. 9). The extremes of temper-
ature were also somewhat higher, with Samara’s July aver-
age at 1.1 degrees higher than in Bismarck, while Samara’s 
yearly temperatures were 0.4 degree less (ibid., pp. 9–10).
During the Soviet period, Field’s (1968) study stood out 
as a rare comparison of the agro-climatic circumstances in 
the USSR and US. Based on the length of the growing sea-
son and the precipitation to evaporation ratio, he found that 
some 80 percent of Soviet arable land fell within the least 
productive thermal zone (Field 1968, p. 9). According to 
Field (ibid., p. 8), the climate in Rostov, one of Russia’s 
top agricultural regions located in the south of the black 
earth region, is equivalent to South-Dakota, having a rela-
tively marginal position in US agriculture (Iofe and Nefe-
dova 2004, p. 47). In the post-Soviet era, Iofe and Nefe-
dova (ibid., p. 48), replicating Field’s methodology with 
improved data, arrived at similar conclusions, and Dronin 
and Bellinger (2005, p. 8) also stressed Russia’s harsher cli-
mate. Besides the more extreme climate, as evidenced by 
annual temperatures and rainfall, Russia’s weather is also 
more volatile year after year. Long-term researcher of Soviet 
agriculture and the impact of weather, Wheatcroftsum up, 
weather variability in general (1977, p. 3) states:
Because of the complex meteorological factors the 
weather in the USSR andparticularly in the major agri-
cultural producer areas fluctuates significantly more 
thanin all other major producer areas. The extent of 
these fluctuations in annual averagetemperature and 
rainfall levels is still considerable even when they have 
beensmoothed by means of a five year moving average.
This volatile weather results from ‘the combination of a high 
continental weather pattern, with the occasional blocking 
in the seasonal paths of cyclones’ (ibid., p. 3), producing 
‘dry hot east winds’ which blow all the way ‘from Central 
Asia across the Volga, Northern Caucasus and the Ukraine’ 
(ibid.). These hot winds from the deserts bring high tem-
peratures and virtually no rainfall, causing serious droughts 
across the whole chernozem region.
Foreign farm companies’ struggle with climate
As mentioned above, when foreign companies entered 
the black earth region, beyond some mention of general 
mismanagement and inefficiency during the Soviet period, 
they made little or no references to the history of erratic 
harvests and the essential connections to the harsh and 
volatile climate. The corporate documents read almost as 
if the region had no prior agricultural history (cf. Kuns 
et al. 2016). Yet, when the farm companies started their 
operations, they soon faced similar climate-related prob-
lems as the Soviet farms. Due to the long winters, time 
slots for activities like sowing, fertilizer application and 
harvesting are brief, as the weather rapidly changes in the 
short growing season. The celebrated chernozem can turn 
into an insurmountable hindrance when the melting snow 
turns it into mud. As a foreign farm manager in the South 
of Russia relates (Jewer 2013, n.p.):
Most of the fertiliser is applied in the snow or on 
frosty ground. (…) This is the only time you can 
travel; once the snow melts the fields are untravel-
lable for weeks! By the time they will travel it really 
is too late to apply nitrogen, or else it’s too dry to do 
any good!
A report on Trigon Agri (Agrimoney.com 2015) sums up 
the long series of weather-related threats that the Nordic 
farm company faced in just 1 year: inundations in July that 
‘delayed and hurt’ early harvest, followed by the scourge of 
‘dry and very hot’ weather from August to mid-November, 
with ‘no significant rain for about 3 months’. Finally, in 
October, the company’s landholdings experienced ‘unsea-
sonal frost’ afecting the late harvest, as well as the prepara-
tions for the following year’s harvest. Interviewed investors 
admitted that the importance of soil fertility for agricultural 
performance and overall profitability had been widely over-
stated (cf. Kuns et al. 2016). One investor said that his com-
pany and other Western investors ‘were driven by a simplis-
tic view’ (cf. Visser 2017, p. 195). Over time, and through 
a costly process, investors learned that weather conditions, 
particularly rainfall, were much more critical than initially 
expected. As an investor interviewed by the author stated 
(cf. Visser 2017, p. 196):
You can have the best soil in the world, but if the 
temperature goes up over 35 degrees, and soil tem-
perature goes to 60 degrees, then you have no rain for 
4–5 weeks in a row, it will kill your crop.
To sum up, the farm imaginaries’ focus on soil, and particu-
larly its depth—a clear example of the separation, simplifica-
tion, and abstraction that are part of resource and asset mak-
ing in farmland—appears to have been too narrow. Investors 
employed imaginaries that themselves lacked ‘depth’, in 
terms of the extent of regional knowledge of agro-climatic 
conditions and histories. In the rare cases where farmland 
investors took into account precipitation, for instance, they 
used standardized indicators such as average annual rainfall 
by province, which did not capture the drastic interregional 
and seasonal variability. This resulted in a shaky foundation 
for asset making. Once farm companies and their sharehold-
ers, faced with recurrent droughts, recognized that soil fer-
tility was a weak predictor of yields and profits, farmland 
as a financial asset experienced a sharp erosion in terms of 
stock valuation and landholding liquidity (Kuns et al. 2016; 
Visser 2017).
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Explaining ignorance of climate in the land 
imaginaries
The centuries-long ignorance of climate in land imaginaries 
of the black earth raises the question: How could this hap-
pen? This question is also an entry point into more theoreti-
cal questions of wider relevance beyond the black earth, on 
ignorance of climate in land imaginaries. The sparse studies 
that do pay attention to the issue (mostly in passing), suggest 
that the sidelining of climatic conditions in farmland imagi-
naries of farmland investors is not exclusive to the black 
earth region. For instance, during the settlement of the Great 
Plains in the US farmers widely underestimated the risk of 
droughts (Worster 1979; Rees 2004). In Australia, known 
for its difficult climate, high profile contemporary farmland 
investments failed, just as domestic outside investment pro-
jects did earlier, with investors’ underestimation of climate 
risk being an important factor (Magnan 2015). As Uekötter 
and Lübken (2014, p. 3) state ‘ignorance about the envi-
ronment has multiple dimensions and causes’, this section 
attempts to unveil some of these dimensions and causes in 
relation to farmland imaginaries. The questions it addresses 
are: Is ignorance in land imaginaries a ‘normal’ result of the 
selectivity inherent in the process of resource making? Or is 
such ignorance related to resource making in frontier areas 
in particular? Are there other historical or material aspects 
of the resource that can explain persistent ignorance of cli-
mate risk, such as encountered in the black earth?
Resource making and ignorance of climate
Making natural objects ready for exploitation and/or invest-
ment involves a process of selection and simplification (Li 
2014; Richardson and Weszkalnys 2014; Visser 2017). Not 
all aspects of a natural object are equally relevant from a 
business perspective, thus some aspects will be highlighted, 
and others will only get superficial treatment or will be 
ignored. However, the climate appears to be very influen-
tial regarding the success or failure of the agricultural ven-
tures, so the general simplification that is part and parcel of 
resource making cannot explain this ignorance. Moreover, 
the ignorance has been so persistent over the centuries, even 
in the face of mounting contrary evidence, that additional 
factors/forces should be taken into consideration.
Frontiers and ignorance of climate
Literature on resource frontiers provides an additional expla-
nation for more pronounced cases of ignorance. In frontier 
settings, with a new resource or new regions being subject 
to resource exploitation, investors’ knowledge about the 
resource or area is ‘almost inevitably scarce’ (Uekötter and 
Lübken 2014, p. 4). Moreover, frontiers normally feature 
the idea of a first mover advantage which leads to rushed 
decision making by investors (Li 2014, p. 595), based on 
very limited consideration of available knowledge. The 
chernozem region during the pre-Soviet (and to some extent 
again during the post-Soviet) period(s) can be characterized 
as a resource frontier, as the Tsarist empire’s colonization 
of the steppes in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
replaced extensive nomadic husbandry with settler agricul-
ture.13 During the nineteenth and early twentieth century, the 
expansion of railroads and the rise of the black earth region 
as a global wheat exporter meant an intensification of the 
resource frontier. Even before the advent of the Soviet Union 
in 1917, practically the whole black earth area of Russia 
and Ukraine was ploughed up (Iofe and Nefedova 1998). 
In the post-Soviet era, the idea of the black earth region as a 
frontier of international farmland investment resurfaced in 
popular and academic accounts (Kramer 2008; Visser et al. 
2012; Winter 2012). This was reinforced by the availability 
of vast surfaces of supposedly ‘pristine, untouched’ farm-
land (Kramer 2008) that had been abandoned during the 
deep crisis of the 1990s (Visser et al. 2012) and the rapid 
re-insertion of the region’s agriculture in global markets.
During the pre-Soviet frontier period, newcomers faced a 
dearth of knowledge on agro-climatic conditions, as agricul-
ture on the black earth had no long history and soil science 
and climate knowledge were still in their infancy.14 Igno-
rance resulted in no small way from the absence of infor-
mation. During the land rush frontier of the 2000s, much 
more scientific knowledge about agro-climatic factors and 
tools to measure agro-climatic conditions existed (such as 
moisture sensors, data from weather stations, etc.). However, 
such (contemporary) knowledge did not significantly influ-
ence the farm operations, as the farmland investors were 
driven by a typical frontier mentality focussed on quickly 
amassing as much cheap resources (farmland) as possible 
before land prices jumped up. The executive director of one 
of the Nordic companies complained that his advice against 
the purchase of a large farm—due to its poor agro-climatic 
features—was ignored by the board; instead, the vision of 
acquiring as much black earth farmland as possible prevailed 
(Kuns et al. 2016). The strategy of rushed land acquisition, 
virtually without taking into account agro-climatic evidence, 
was reinforced by the fact that the top management levels of 
the large farm companies often consisted of people with a 
background in finance, real estate and other sectors, rather 
13 And part of the nineteenth century.




than agribusiness.15 Amongst the three Nordic farm com-
panies listed on the stock exchange that operated in Rus-
sia and Ukraine, none featured members with agricultural 
experience on their boards during the first years of operation 
(Kuns et al. 2016).
Foreign companies had some awareness of weather risks, 
but thought that they could simply be mitigated. They dealt 
with weather and climate change risks through so-called 
‘weather hedging’, which is the geographic dispersion of 
land holdings in a way that bad weather in one region (such 
as a drought or a hail storm) can be ofset by more favour-
able weather on land holdings in another region (Trigon 
Agri 2011, p. 7). The idea was that that they had little to 
worry about regarding local agro-ecological circumstances 
because natural risks even out over the geographically dis-
persed landholdings. However, the ideas that the climate in 
the chernozem zone was somewhat mild, predictable, and 
that it harboured sufficient intra-regional variation to allow 
weather hedging, were all contrary to scientific evidence. 
As discussed earlier, numerous studies from the early nine-
teenth century onwards have demonstrated the huge risks of 
drought in the area, and have convincingly argued that the 
climate is significantly harsher than in the US agricultural 
heartland. Wheatcroft (1977) for instance, has shown that 
most droughts simultaneously afected almost the whole 
chernozem belt over many thousands of kilometres from 
Western Ukraine far into European Russia, unsettling the 
(convenient) idea of weather hedging. However, it was not 
only rushed corporate decision-making typical for resource 
frontiers that hampered more balanced assessments based 
on inclusion of climate knowledge. As will be argued below, 
investors’ oversight was the result of a much broader, per-
sistent ignorance of climate in Western science and policy 
advice on post-Soviet agriculture.
Ideology and ignorance of climate
Investors’ ignorance of a long series of first-hand experi-
ences and scientific evidence on climate in the chernozem 
zone, should be understood within the context of a much 
wider, longstanding ignorance of such knowledge within 
domestic and Western society, and among policy advisors 
and academics. Multiple factors seem to have contributed to 
investors’ ignorance.
First, ideological preoccupations have led to a society-
wide forgetting of a body of research on climate, which 
has hampered a relatively unbiased assessment. Biases 
have existed both in scholarly and policy studies, as well 
as amongst the investor community. In much of the West-
ern literature, the failures of Soviet agriculture have been 
attributed to political factors (such as the inefficiencies of 
a top-down command economy, weak labour motivation in 
collective farms et cetera), whereas climatic factors have 
been denounced as mere excuses of the Soviet regime (Iofe 
and Nefedova 2004, p. 47; Smith 2014). The passive ‘mak-
ing’ of ignorance (ignorance as a ‘selective choice’ or ‘lost 
realm’ in the words of Proctor 2008, p. 4) has taken place. 
Pre-soviet studies such as by Carleton and others have been 
forgotten, and new studies on climatic factors were virtu-
ally unknown during the Soviet period (an exception being 
Field 1968). The Soviet regime itself, with its strong belief 
in engineering nature (Dronin and Bellinger 2005) had lit-
tle tolerance for kolkhoz chairmen referring to climate to 
explain failures. As Smith (2014, p. 61), notes:
Crucially, the Soviet state overlooked its primary 
adversary, which was natural, not cultural.[It] 
approached Soviet rural areas as socially backward 
places that needed order and discipline in order to 
become modern (…).
However, agriculture was ‘dominated by austere natural 
realities far more than by backward social mentalities or 
revolutionary political spirits’ (ibid.). Overall, while there 
was substantial literature on climate risks in the black earth 
region, such literature has largely been forgotten, through 
what Proctor (2008, p. 6) called ignorance as a ‘selective 
choice’ or ‘passive construct’.
Second, the mainstream discourse that depicted the fail-
ures of Soviet agriculture as solely attributable to political 
factors have fitted the perceptions and interests of foreign 
farmland investors. This discourse has helped to frame a 
Russian agriculture freed from socialist bureaucracy as 
very promising. Investors’ observations of widely aban-
doned lands (AlpcotAgro 2008) have also been conducive 
to framing of Russian agriculture as a clean sleet. A settler/
colonizer ideology negatively viewing indigenous engage-
ments with nature also led newcomers in other settings to 
grossly ignore weather risks. US settlers in the West, for 
instance, saw native Americans’ pastoral and farming prac-
tices of coping with drought as primitive and irrelevant 
(Moon 2020). In North Africa, French colonial plantations 
sufered dramatically from shallow farmland imaginaries, 
which assumed that the arid farmlands were the result of 
overgrazing and deforestation by the local population, rather 
than climatic conditions (Davis 2007).
Fabricating climate ignorance?
The question arises as to what extent farmland companies 
and brokers were aware of the climatic risks, yet actively 
15 Scientifically informed perspectives can also be problematic. See 
Davis (2007) on how flawed French scientific ideas of previous defor-
estation and desertification in North Africa misinformed colonial 
agrarian endeavors.
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ignored and/or downplayed them, or even fabricated evi-
dence, with ignorance being an ‘active construct’ and ‘stra-
tegic ploy’ (Proctor 2008, p. 8). Studies on the US Great 
Plains feature ample examples of boosters actively sup-
pressing unfavourable information about farmland, or even 
intentionally creating false, over-optimistic information (see 
Fairbairn et al. this issue) on contemporary US investors 
silencing climate risks. The Western booster Josiah Gregg, 
for instance, efused in 1844 that the extreme cultivation of 
farmland might contribute to increased rainfall (Rees 2004, 
p. 82; cf. Uekötter and Lübken 2014, p. 5). This ‘theory’ 
was then initially taken on by a scientist, and many prospec-
tive farmers flocked to the West. Knowledge that refuted the 
boosters’ stories was actively suppressed. An official at the 
US geological society who actively warned against these 
accounts that underestimated the climate risks, was forced 
out of his post by boosters (Rees 2004, pp. 83–84). Exten-
sive study of company documents and in-depth interviews 
with investors in Russian farmland did not generate indica-
tions of intentional silencing of climate risks. Ignorance is 
predominantly a ‘passive construct’ (Proctor 2008, p. 6) by 
investors, on top of a much longer history of passive igno-
rance in Cold War-era academics and policy.
The senses, knowledge and ignorance of climate
That ideological stances could relatively easily turn large 
bodies of literature on climate in the black earth region into 
‘a lost realm’ (Proctor 2008, p.4) was facilitated by the dif-
ficulties of grasping the climate properly. The parallel cel-
ebration of soil and ignorance of climate is also a result of 
the very diferent sensory capabilities to garner knowledge 
regarding these two issues. Interesting in this respect is Ker-
ans’ (2001, pp. 27–28) description of how imaginary first-
time travellers to Russia’s black earth region Tambov in the 
nineteenth century would have experienced the countryside:
If the travellers had never before visited the region, the 
soil below the flora would likely catch their attention. 
Wherever the ground was laid bare by recent tillage, its 
dark brown hue, sometimes truly verging on the black, 
betrayed the fertility of the land’. Moving a substantial 
distance along in a southern or easterly direction, an 
observant traveller would note that (…) water sources 
became sparser. If he took the initiative to inquire of 
the locals along the way, he would learn that the rain 
fell less consistently …’. Even further south-east in the 
province, ‘the monotony of the landscape was joined 
to the unpredictability of precipitation. The quality of 
the soil remained superlative, but the threat of drought 
could never be far from the farmer’s mind (Kerans 
2001, p. 28).
This description alludes to an important diference in sen-
sory capabilities in assessing soil versus climate. The quality 
of the soil, especially if laid bare, can directly be assessed 
visually. In contrast, the amount of rainfall (and the risk of 
drought) has to be assessed more indirectly from attentively 
observing the diminishing presence of water sources, and 
actively asking farmers about it. Further, the relative absence 
of something (rainfall) is less easily noticed than something 
permanently present like soil of which manifold parameters 
(like colour, depth, and structure) can be assessed at any 
moment in time. Sight has been the predominant mode to 
perceive landscapes, and the world at large, especially in 
European (including Russian) society where it concerns 
knowledge rather than emotions. ‘There is a profound con-
nection forged over half a millennium between the modern 
usage of landscape (…) and the exercise of sight or vision 
as a principal means of associating that space with human 
concerns’ (Cosgrove 2003, p. 249). Through pictures and 
later photographs visual observations can be communicated 
more easily than information gathered through senses like 
smell or taste, and swiftly becomes accepted knowledge. As 
mentioned earlier, various farmland companies operating in 
the black earth region featured images of the black soil as 
evocative clues of bountiful farming conditions.
For further examination beyond sight, the soil can be 
touched, generating further clues about the structure of the 
soil, and one can smell it. This also allows somewhat more 
emotional clues connected with touch, smell, and even taste 
that reinforces positive connections with the soil. Earlier 
on it was mentioned how a contemporary farmland investor 
took the soil with him on an investment road tour for poten-
tial investors to see, touch and smell. Iofe and Nefedova 
(1998, p. 196) describe how Western scientists visiting the 
Soviet Union, demanded to get out of their busses to touch 
the black earth soil and ‘kneaded the fat damp lumps of soil 
in their hands’ momentarily impressed by the fertility of the 
farmland. Assessing climate is difficult, as weather does not 
present itself in a relatively fixed state like soil which can 
be easily spotted by sight, recorded and transmitted as an 
image. Weather can vary from day to day and requires com-
bining a more elusive set of indicators captured by various 
senses and tools in order to distil a weather pattern (climate). 
Variability becomes a formidable obstacle to assessing cli-
mate when climate is strongly volatile over the years, or 
even drastically varies from decade to decade.16 Examples 
from the US West are illuminating in this respect. During the 
whole period 1878–1887 the entire Great Plains area west of 
the ninety-eighth meridian experienced extraordinary boun-
tiful rainfall (Rees 2004, p. 84). The highly atypical rainfall 
lured many farmers to settle in the area. It tricked farmers 
16 This is even without anthropogenic climate change.
 O. Visser 
1 3
into believing that this was the normal climate in the region 
and caused a proliferation of optimistic beliefs (for instance 
that the newly constructed railways and electricity lines or 
intensive ploughing generated increased rainfall). In Russia, 
such yearly volatility is even starker (Dronin and Bellinger 
2005, pp. 5–6). Wheatcroft  and Davies (1994, p. 45) has 
argued that the agricultural boom in early twentieth century 
Tsarist Russia, widely attributed to politics (for example the 
Stolypin land reforms), was in fact largely caused by a long 
period of exceptionally favourable weather. The difficulties 
in agriculture in the 1920s–1930s, while certainly triggered 
by erratic policies, were substantially reinforced by succes-
sive droughts (Wheatcroft 1977). To sum up, weather varia-
bility in general, and the stark volatility of climate over years 
or decades, can easily deceive scientists who have access to 
abundant data, let alone newcomers who have to judge the 
situation on the spot, based on their own senses.
Conclusions
The environmental history approach to land investment and 
transformations, as applied here, shows the striking persis-
tence of land imaginaries, even when their material founda-
tions are shaky. This article has demonstrated that inves-
tors’ celebration of the soil, and particularly its depth, has a 
centuries-long history. This celebration has had considerable 
downsides as it has led to downplaying or ignoring other fac-
tors—notably climatic risk—with important repercussions 
for the viability of the farm operations. The investigation 
of farmland imaginaries and investment operations in the 
black earth region, and the examination of similar tendencies 
elsewhere in the world, suggest that the historical dimen-
sion of land imaginaries deserves more attention. In par-
ticular, the often detrimental ignorance or underestimation 
of climate is striking. This article followed up on the call 
to pay more attention to the historical dimension of farm-
land investment (Edelman and León 2013; Ouma 2016) and 
did so by bringing in its largely unexplored environmental 
history. Despite the appearance of sophistication that often 
surrounds contemporary transnational farmland investments 
and imaginaries, they might be haunted by strikingly similar 
misunderstandings of the agro-climatic context of farmland, 
as their historic predecessors. The selectivity and simplifi-
cation of resource making in general, and in frontiers espe-
cially; the difficulty of assessing climate, especially when 
very volatile, first-hand, based on our senses; and widely 
shared ideological biases that led to passive ignorance of 
Soviet-era scientific evidence; these factors together brought 
about the staggering ignorance of climatic risks by contem-
porary farmland investors in the black earth.
The blind spots in the imaginaries employed by farm-
land investors are replicated by academic studies on land 
investment and land transformations worldwide. While vari-
ous dimensions of land (especially property and territory) 
have received a lot of attention, the climatic conditions con-
nected to farmland investments and other land transforma-
tion have been side-lined. Obviously, there is attention for 
climate change as a global context of land investments, but 
when climate presents itself as a—seemingly—more per-
manent, somewhat predictable condition, it evaporates as 
an analytical category. This suggests that climate moves to 
the margins of human perceptions unless changes are sudden 
and dramatic and, above all, ‘abnormal’. It reminds us of 
Hirsch’s (1995) argument that landscape, and natural envi-
ronment, is best seen as a background to other things. It is 
commonly perceived as a realm of potential, the locus of the 
way things might be, rather than of present, grounded real-
ity (ibid.). The land imaginaries concept—especially when 
combined with a historical perspective and recent insights 
on ignorance (Proctor 2008)—can help to direct attention to 
the selectivity, ignorance, and implicitness in human percep-
tions and representations regarding land transformations and 
climate and their tremendous socio-economic and environ-
mental implications.
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